RECENT CASES
or influencing the judiciary. If the argument of Evans v. Gore is inexorably pursued, the
judiciary may demand protection from every form of legislation which decreases their
salaries, no matter how indirectly, as, for instance, from the nullification of gold clauses
in obligations.
Corporations-Professions-Practice of Dentistry by Corporate Bodies-[lhinois].
-A dental corporation sought to enjoin the defendant from violating his agreement
not to practice dentistry for three years within a certain distance from the corporate
location. Held, since the plaintiff's corporate charter could not authorize it to practice
dentistry (Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. St. 1933, C. 9I, § 72a), it was not entitled to equitable
relief. Dr. Allison, Dentist, Iw., v. Allison, 360 Ill. 638, x96 N.E. 799 (1935).
Corporations are forbidden, either by express statutes or judicial construction of
licensing statutes, to practice the professions. PainlessParkerv. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P. (2d) 67 (1932) (dentistry); In re Co-operativeLaw Co., ig8
N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (19io) (law); People v. Woodbury DernatologicalInstitute, 192
N.Y. 454, 85 N.E. 697 (19o8) (medicine); z Fletcher, Corporations § 97 (1931). Apparently because of the public interest, statutes have excepted hospitals and charitable
corporations from this prohibition. See People v. Woodbury Dermatological Institute,
8
192 N.Y. 454, 5 N.E. 697 (19o8).
The general prohibition against corporate practice is designed to protect the public
by making it impossible for corporations formed by laymen and presumably guided by
motives of profit to practice in the professions, where economic interest should not
overshadow social obligations and public duties. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 198
N.Y. 479, 484, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (191o); Weihofen "Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary
Corporations: A Social Utility, 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. ixg (I934). But the social
reasons for preventing corporations controlled by laymen from practicing the professions do not apply to corporations organized and conducted by licensed members of the
professions. See State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Ia. 781, 786, 234 N.W. 260, 263 (i931).
Cf. State Electro-MedicalInstitute v. Plainer,74 Neb. 23, 1o3 N.W. 1079 (1905). Against
all corporations, it is urged that they make impossible the personal relation that should
obtain in the professions. See Parker v. Dental Board of Examiners of Cal., 216 Cal.
285, 297, 14 P. (2d) 67, 72 (1932); N.J. PhotoEngraving Co. v. Schonert & Sons, 95 N.J.
Eq. 12, 13, 122 Atl. 307,308 (1923); 1 Fletcher, Corporations § 97 (I93:). But it is hard
to see just what personal elements are lost when a group of professional men incorporate
themselves to offer services they had previously offered individually. While it is true
that the corporation itself would not possess these personal qualifications, its members
would. The real basis of the decisions denying the corporate right to practice law or
medicine seems to be the fear of commercial exploitation of the profession. See Parker
v. DentalBoardof Examiners of Cal., 216 Cal. 285, 297, 14 P. (2d) 67, 72 (1932); Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations, 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. rig
(1934). Since, according to the suggested distinction, only professional men will direct
the corporation, and since the licenses of individual members of the profession and of
the corporation can be revoked, the dangers of commercial exploitation and corporate
irresponsibility appear to be overemphasized.
The principal case does not reveal whether the dental corporation was organized
solely by licensed dentists. Emphatic denials by the Illinois courts of the right to practice law even by non-profit corporations (People v. Assn. of Real Estate Taxpayers of
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Ill., 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933); People v. Motorists' Assn. of Ill., 354 Ill. 595, i88
N.E. 827 (1934)), by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the judiciary over admission
to the bar, in the face of an express statute permitting such non-pecuniary corporate
practice (Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, C.32, § 228), indicate that Illinois is hardly likely
to distinguish between corporations organized by professional men and those by laymen.

Damages-Carriers-Extent of Liability in Tort and Contract-[England].-The
plaintiff owner sued the defendant carrier in alternate counts in conversion and breach
of contract for non-delivery of forty-seven tons of high-grade wheat which the defendant had contracted to deliver in England. Five months before time for delivery, the
plaintiff had contracted for resale and, because at the time of non-delivery there was
no market in which he could buy to meet his sub-contract, he demanded the resale
price. In this five-month interval, there was a substantial decrease in the market price
of similar wheat. Held, (Scrutton, L. J., dissenting) the plaintiff was not entitled to the
loss of profits on this sub-contract but only to the value of the goods at the time of the
breach. This was determined not by the resale price but by reference to the decline in
wheat prices on the market. The Arpad, 152 L. T. Rep. 521 (1934).
Generally, damages in contract are limited to those losses which are foreseeable at
the time of the making of the contract, while in tort damages are limited only by the
rule that they must be the natural result of the defendant's act. 3 Williston, Contracts § 1344 (1920). That different rules should apply is inherent in the distinction
between the two: in tort, the duty is a compulsory one incidental to membership in
society, while the duty in contract is assumed voluntarily and limited because of the social policy in favor of encouraging commerce. i Sedgwick, Damages § 141 (9 th ed.
1912)). More particularly, then, damages in contract should be the equivalent in money of that which the contract entitled the plaintiff to receive, e.g., in a carrier's contract, the value of the goods; whereas damages in tort should be equivalent to the plaintiff's actual loss, i.e., the actual value to him. Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations,
21 Yale L. J. 533, 550 (1912); 3 Sedgwick, Damages § 844 (9th ed. 1912). What, then,
is the distinction between the value of the goods and the actual value to the plaintiff?
Where there is a market for the goods at the time for delivery, the value of the goods
for a carrier's contract is the market price at the destination or, in the absence of one
there, at the nearest market plus the freight necessary to transport the goods from
there. r Sedgwick, Damages § 246 (9th ed. 1912); Grand Tower v. Phillips, 90 U.S.
471 (1874); Eddy v. Lafayette, 49 Fed. 807 (C.C.A. 8th 1892); 8 R.C.L. 489 (1915); see
57 L.R.A. 197 (19o3). Resale contracts are considered as "mere accidental circumstances" in such situations. Rodocanachiv. Milburn, 56 L. T. Rep. 594 (i886). The resale price is unavailable to contradict the market price as the standard of value.
i Sedgwick, Damages § 244 (9th ed. 1912). Nor can recovery ordinarily be had for loss
of profits unless it can be shown that defendant had notice of the sub-contract. Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. Rep. 341 (1854); Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (18S8); 3 Williston,
Contracts § 1356 (1920); see Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540
(19o3). But if the goods have no market of their own, other standards must be applied
and the use of the general range of wheat prices in the instant case affords one satis-

